Using the phone to contact debtors is a risky method of communication and debt collectors use such a mode of communication at their peril.” See, Berg v. Merchants Assoc. Collection Div.,Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1344 (S.D. Fl. 2008).
“It does not seem unfair to require that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the line.” See, FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 393, 85 S. Ct. 1035, 13 L.Ed. 2D 904 (1965).
The FDCPA is a remedial statute to be broadly construed so as to effect its purpose. See, Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450 (3rd Cir. 2006).
The FDCPA is “an extraordinarily broad statute” and must be enforced “as Congress has written it.” See, Frey v. Gangwish, 970 F.2d 1516 (6th Cir. 1992).
The FDCPA is liberally construed in favor of the consumer to effectuate its purposes. Cirkot v. Diversified Financial Systems, Inc., 839 F.Supp. 941, 944 (D. Conn. 1993); & Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1117 (10th Cir. 2002).
The FDCPA is an extraordinarily broad statute. Hamilton v.United Healthcare of Louisiana,Inc., 310 F.3d 385 (5th Cir. 2002).
"Because it is designed to protect consumers, the FDCPA is generally liberally construed.” Ross v. Commercial Fin. Serv. Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1079 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
FDCPA is a remedial statute which should be construed liberally in favor of the consumer. McDonaiel v. South & Assocs., P.C., 325 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Kan. 2004).
FDCPA is a remedial statute and should be construed broadly. Mushinsky v. Nelson, Watson & Assoc., L.L.C., 642 F. Supp. 2d 470 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
The FDCPA is a "[r]emedial, strict liability statute which was intended to be applied in a liberal manner." Picht. v. Hawks, 77 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1043 (D. Minn. 1999) aff'd, 236 F.3d 446 (8th Cir.2001).
“When determining whether a debt collector violated the FDCPA, the court's focus is on the actions of the debt collector, not the debtor.” Freyermuth v. Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 248 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir.2001).
"The purpose of the FDCPA is to `eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors,' and debt collectors are liable for failure to comply with `any provision' of the Act." Richmond v. Higgins, 435 F.3d 825, 828 (8th Cir. 2006).
FDCPA imposes strict liability without regard to whether the consumer was misled by the violation. Bishop v. Global Payments Check Recovery Servs., Inc., 2003 WL 21497513 (D. Minn. June 25, 2003).
"The FDCPA establishes a civil cause of action against `any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter with respect to any person.'" Sakrani v. Koenig, No. Civ. A 05-1192, 2006 WL 20514, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2006) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a))
The FDCPA is considered a strict liability statute, meaning that a consumer need not show that the debt collector intentionally, fraudulently, or knowingly violated the Act. Randall v. Nelson & Kennard, 2010 WL 3636258 (D. Ariz. Sept. 20, 2010).
Collector’s reliance on information from the creditor was immaterial since the FDCPA is a strict liability statute. Hayden v. Rapid Collection Sys., Inc., 2006 WL 1127180 (D. Ariz. Apr. 27, 2006).
Since the FDCPA is a strict liability statute, no showing of intent was necessary to establish liability. Irwin v. Mascott, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
The FDCPA establishes a strict liability standard and requires only one violation for a consumer to prevail. A debt collector may still violate the FDCPA while simultaneously following an authorized state procedure. Chalik v. Westport Recovery Corp., 677 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
FDCPA is a strict liability statute so the consumer need not show that the violation was intentional. Pollack v. Bay Area Credit Serv., L.L.C., 2009 WL 2475167 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2008).
“[T]he FDCPA as a strict liability statute, such that no evidence of intent to mislead or deceive is necessary. Milton v. LTD Fin. Serv. Inc., 2011 WL 291363 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 25, 2011).
The FDCPA is generally a strict liability statute and does not require proof of actual damages to support a claim. Boyko v. Am. Intern. Group, Inc., 2009 WL 5194431 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2009).
The FDCPA is a strict liability statute. Quotes Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 35 (2nd Cir. 1996); “n the general context of consumer protection—of which the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act is a part—‘it does not seem unfair to require that one who deliberately goes perilously chose to tan area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the line.’” Cavallaro v. Law Offices of Shapiro & Kriesman, 933 F. Supp. 1148 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
“The FDCPA is a strict liability statute, and only one violation of the FDCPA is necessary to establish civil liability.” Agueros v. Hudson & Kyse, L.L.C., 2010 WL 3418286 (Tex. App. Aug. 31, 2010).
The FDCPA is a strict liability statute, and debt collectors whose conduct fails short of its requirements are liable here respective of their intentions. Ruth v. Triumph P’ships, 577 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2009).
The protections of the FDCPA are not limited to “consumers”; liability is imposed upon a debt collector who has failed to comply with the Act with respect to “any person” pursuant to § 1692k. Dutton v. Wolhar, 809 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Del. 1992), aff’d, 5 F.3d 649 (3rd Cir. 1993).
The FDCPA permits and encourages parties who have suffered no loss to bring civil actions for statutory violations. Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 307
“Unlike most private tort litigants, a plaintiff who brings an FDCPA action seeks to vindicate important rights that cannot be valued solely in monetary terms.” City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 106 S. Ct. 2686, 91 L. Ed. 2d 466 (1986).
The bona fide error defense in the context of a strict liability statute requires the showing of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error and requires more than a mere assertion to that effect. The procedures themselves must be explained, along with the manner in which they were adapted to avoid the error." Wilhelm v. Credico, Inc., 519 F.3d 416, 421 (8th Cir. 2008).
“The bona fide error defense is limited to clerical errors. See, Picht v. Jon R. Hawks, Ltd., 236 F. 3d 446, 451 (8th Cir. 2001).